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Abstract 
The software industry is facing a fundamental change from On-premises to On-demand software. To 
survive, well-established companies have to adjust strategies and governance. One of the most 
difficult challenges is to shift the focus from the (still) profitable On-premises market to an, as yet 
unprofitable, On-demand market. This requires a major rethink for managers as well as for company 
structuring. Based on our case studies and Christensen’s theory for managing disruptive innovations, 
we wish to learn from software companies and their transformation strategies to discover to what 
extent the theory’s recommendations are applicable for software companies. We have seen that a 
company needs an effective strategy in order to survive market changes. From our two cases we 
learned that a successful transformation strategy consists of the combination of Christensen’s 
recommendations, its individual adjustments as well as some additional strategies. We were able to 
develop seven propositions for software providers to give ideas in order to better cope with the 
transformation process. 
Keywords: Transformation strategy, Cloud Computing, Theory of Disruptive Innovation, Software 
Industry. 
1 Introduction 
For a long time On-premises was the dominating delivery model for the software industry. Installed 
software runs on computers on the premises of the persons or organizations using the software 
(Buxmann et al., 2008). Now, however, cloud computing technology, using the Software as a Service 
(SaaS) model, allows consumers to use the provider‟s applications on a cloud infrastructure. This 
development has meant a fundamental change within the software industry (Benlian et al., 2010). 
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, On-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell and Grance, 2011). A few years ago 
no one could see where the development would lead to and the potential that lay within. However, 
recent years have shown that On-demand software has become fully established and become an 
important way to deliver software in the information technology (IT) landscape. The concept of SaaS 
is nothing new. Some see it as a form of outsourcing, resulting in some similar advantages and 
disadvantages (Benlian et al., 2010). Others note that Application Service Providing (ASP) can be 
seen as the ancestor of SaaS (Günther et al., 2001). The difference between these concepts is that SaaS 
might have a lot more potential and offers more opportunities for both users and providers. This 
potential steams mostly from the development and widespread adoption of internet technologies and 
standards. Today a user simply needs access to the internet via web browser which is not a critical 
point anymore. Concerning ASP, interested parties needed comprehensive IT expertise and high 
upfront investments in IT. This might be an explanation why ASP was not able to revolutionize the 
Kaltenecker et al., / Strategic Transformation of Software Companies 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                        2 
market. However, due to the IT development, there is great debate on the potential of SaaS to disrupt 
the structures of the software industry (Lyytinen and Rose, 2003; Keller and Hüsig, 2009; Sultan and 
van de Bunt-Kokhuis, 2012; DaSilva et al., 2013; Kaltenecker et al., 2013).  
Disruptive innovations have the potential to create a new market as well as both disrupting the existing 
market and displacing earlier technologies (Christensen, 1997). A number of examples in various 
industries have proven that incumbents are often not able to change strategies in spite of good 
managers running the company. In order to survive in a changing industry, strategies and governances 
of a company have to be reconsidered. Well-established companies have to think about offering 
products in the upcoming market. Adhering rigidly to old ways and not evolving can lead to problems 
such as losing market shares and not staying competitive (Bower and Christensen, 1995). Basically, 
there are two types of companies that offer On-demand software: Start-up companies, which are new 
in the market and start right away with SaaS product, and established companies which already offer 
software products in the On-premises market. Start-up companies struggle with issues typically related 
to their resources (Christensen, 1997). On the contrary, well-established companies have problems 
developing products based on new technology. SaaS products require quite distinct capabilities 
compared to On-premises products. Additionally, established companies have to shift their focus away 
from the (still) profitable On-premises market towards an (as yet) unprofitable and unknown On-
demand market. Although this is an urgent challenge, neither literature that focuses on software 
companies (De Marez et al., 2011) nor on SaaS (Benlian et al., 2010) responds to this problem. 
However, we can revert to the knowledge from innovation management theory. The phenomenon of 
changing industries due to disruptive innovations is well-known since Christensen (1997) introduced 
his theory of disruptive innovation to academia and practice. He explains by means of examples from 
different branches what disruptive innovations are and what they mean for companies. Additionally, 
Christensen also provides advice on how affected incumbents should deal with these situations. The 
strength of this framework lies in the simple way in which the phenomenon is described. Many studies 
have therefore used the theory to analyze industries and give support to management decisions 
(Markides, 2006; Yu and Hang, 2009). However, Christensen‟s recommendations on how well-
established companies should handle such situations are quite general and only address big players 
(Yu and Hang, 2009). Strategies and specific recommendations for smaller and medium-sized 
companies, especially in the software industry, are absent.  
A review of the literature shows that other studies either derive recommendations focusing on other 
branches (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2007) or target 
incremental rather than disruptive innovations (Madanmohan, 2005). Additionally, their focus is on 
the disruptive phenomenon itself without providing recommendations for managers (von Hippel, 
1986; Afuah, 2000; von Hippel, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; Soukhoroukova et al., 2012; Lucas and 
Goh, 2009; Downes and Nunes, 2013). 
According to the dynamics in the software market outlined above, this paper aims to achieve two 
things: Firstly, due to our case study approach, we hope to learn how successful companies deal with 
disruptive changes in the market. We wish to learn from their strategies how they handle the 
transformation process from an On-premises company to a company focusing on SaaS. Based upon 
our understanding, a successful company offers a stable and robust version of its On-demand software 
and already generates revenue with its products. Secondly, supporting the idea that SaaS is an 
innovation with a potentially disruptive character, we choose Christensen‟s framework and investigate 
the applicability of his recommendations to the software industry and its players. As small and 
medium-sized companies represent a much greater part of the market than the big players (Destatis, 
2013), recommendations and strategies for those companies should be taken into account.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. First, we give a brief overview of the theory of 
disruptive innovation as well as a summary of the state of the art concerning recommendations and 
strategies due to disruptive innovations. Next, we describe our methodology in detail – a case study 
approach. We then present the results provided by our sample. Finally, we discuss the results, which 
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then lead to recommendations for software incumbents and draw up a number of conclusions, further 
research options, and an overview of the potential limitations of this study. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Theory of Disruptive Innovation 
Christensen and Bower (1996) define disruptive technologies as technologies that disrupt an 
established trajectory of performance improvement, or redefine what performance means. In the sense 
of Henderson and Clark (1990), trajectory-disrupting changes are typically simple architectural 
innovations. These new innovations can rarely be used in established markets, particularly in their 
early phase (Christensen, 1997). Christensen further characterizes disruptive technologies as initially 
underperforming the dominant technology in terms of mainstream attributes. However, disruptive 
technologies have other features niche-market customers value. Products and services based on new 
technology commercialize in emerging and insignificant markets, mainly as they are initially 
unwanted by leading companies‟ most profitable customers. Additionally, established companies 
retain their old product line and try to develop and improve its performance because the potentially 
disruptive technologies cannot be seen as a rational financial option. Regardless of these companies‟ 
decisions to invest or not to invest in the potentially disrupting innovation, the new technology slowly 
but steadily improves, until it meets the low end of mainstream performance standards. We see that 
start-up companies in particular promote this kind of development. Ultimately, the new products and 
services have the power to displace the dominant technology (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). 
The previously inferior technology becomes fully performance-competitive. There is a high likelihood 
of the bigger players being pushed out of their core business because of new technology innovations. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) note that there are three different strategies for a firm in order to create 
new businesses: Sustaining innovation results in performance improvement concerning attributes 
valued by the mainstream market. Companies aim at their most profitable customers who are willing 
to pay for improved performance. Sustaining innovation helps to improve or maintain profit margins 
by exploiting the existing processes and cost structures, and making better use of the current 
competitive advantages. The second strategy is, by contrast, a low-end disruption. It creates products 
which are good enough in terms of the traditional attributes of performance at the low end of the 
mainstream market. This strategy focuses on over-served customers by utilizing a new operational or 
financial approach. The third and most interesting dimension is called new-market disruption. The 
performance of the product or service results in a lower performance in traditional attributes but 
improved performance in new attributes; typically simplicity and convenience. This strategy targets 
non-consumption, i.e. those customers who historically lacked the money or capacity to buy and use 
the established products or services. The business model must make money at a lower price per unit 
sold, and at unit production volumes that initially are small in emerging markets. 
Although the term disruptive technology is widely used, the expression disruptive innovation seems 
more appropriate in many contexts since few technologies are intrinsically disruptive. Often, the 
business model is seen as an enabler for the technology to become disruptive (Christensen, 2006). 
After all, it is important to note that disruption is an ongoing process; those who disrupt in one 
generation might become disrupted themselves in the next. Although Christensen‟s theory of 
disruptive innovation is well-established in management literature (Tellis, 2006), there are also critics 
(Danneels, 2004; Tellis, 2006; Yu and Hang, 2009). These critics target the theory itself but omit its 
recommendations. It is, however, notable that its recommendations are not specific enough and should 
therefore also be viewed critically. The next section presents these recommendations.  
2.2 The Theory’s Recommendations  
Based on Christensen‟s observations, his ex-post analysis of examples, and interviews with managers, 
he was able to provide some initial recommendations for companies to handle disruptive (low-end or 
Kaltenecker et al., / Strategic Transformation of Software Companies 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                        4 
new-market) innovation. These strategies address managers from big companies across various 
industries (Christensen, 1997). Based on Bower and Christensen (1995), Christensen and Bower 
(1996), and Christensen (1997) we can sort their advice into four categories, which are not exclusive.  
The first category is called spin-off strategy. In big companies, consultants or non-executive 
employees on the second tier of decision-making often recommend which projects should be pursued 
financially (Barnard, 1968). These people are interested in proven, quick return, high profit projects 
and suggest such opportunities to senior managers. That is why they often prefer projects which target 
sustaining technologies instead of disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997). Ideas that are rejected 
in the first selection stage (second decision-making level) are often unknown to senior managers 
(Christensen, 1997). Thus, potentially disruptive innovations have fewer opportunities than sustaining 
technologies concerning the allocation of resources. One solution for this problem might be the 
foundation of a spin-off company (Brower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Bower, 1996; 
Christensen, 1997). The subsidiary should work independently from established business, focusing on 
the potentially disruptive innovation. Spin-off employees are more willing to accept smaller successes 
in the upcoming market (Christensen, 1997).  
The second category is called leader strategy. This point targets the question whether a company 
should enter the upcoming market as a first mover or a follower. Christensen makes this 
recommendation based on empirical data from the hard-disk industry. He found that companies 
bringing a product to the market that was based on disruptive technology within the first two years of 
its appearance, are six times more likely to establish themselves in the new market compared to 
companies that chose the follower strategy (Christensen, 1997). This pattern was confirmed by 
numerous studies of other industries, providing external validity (Christensen, 1997). 
The third category is called expert opinion strategy. Big companies are often listed companies. The 
stock price reflects the profitability of a company and is under the supervision of shareholders. The 
stock price also has a signaling effect on internal and external stakeholders. Furthermore, a managers‟ 
performance is often judged by the stock price development. In order to generate short-term profits, 
sustaining technologies are essential (Christensen, 1997). In the long run however, sustaining 
technologies can be displaced by disruptive innovations. Staff from the technology department, or 
research and development departments, are first to recognize what is coming next. Therefore, their 
expertise and opinion should be integrated into the investment decision process. While this would 
almost certainly lead to investments in less profitable products in a short term perspective (which 
might in turn lead to shareholders disagreements), in order to support the long-term perspective, expert 
opinions from technological employees should be taken into account (Brower and Christensen, 1995). 
The fourth and last category is known as trial and error strategy. In the early phase, disruptive 
innovations have no chance in mass markets. Therefore, it is inadvisable to ask mainstream consumers 
from the mass market regarding their wishes and expectations for product innovation. Traditional 
market analysis strategies are successful in sustaining innovations but cannot be used for disruptive 
markets. Therefore, a different technique must be found. Christensen (1997) recommends a stepwise 
approach as the key to finding a potential market for the disruptive innovation. We call this approach a 
trial and error strategy. It consists of test markets or test products. Investments in these test markets 
should be carefully monitored and not allowed to get out of hand. The strategy results in a step-by-step 
market approach accepting trial and error phases (Brower and Christensen, 1995).  
3 Method 
3.1 Case Study Introduction 
Case studies are a preferred way to investigate real-life phenomena over which the researcher has little 
control (Yin, 2009). The case study research method has already provided many answers to 
management problems (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and is particularly suitable for answering why 
and how questions (Siggelkow, 2007). According to these facts and owing to the lack of prior 
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research, the case study approach (Lee, 1989; Yin, 2009) seems to be an appropriate way in order to 
investigate our research questions. The case studies in this paper can be classified according to the 
following criteria (Keil, 2002; Yin, 2009): Firstly, we used instrumental case studies, since our 
companies were selected to advance the understanding of transformation strategies due to disruptive 
innovation in the software industry. Secondly, a multiple case approach was chosen. This allowed 
reliable data analysis and a general but thorough understanding of the overall case context. We used 
the following criteria to select the case studies. (1) The organization was a well-established player in 
the software industry and not an entrant or start-up company. (2) The company had begun with a pure 
On-premises offer which was successfully established in the market. (3) The company also offered a 
stable and robust On-demand software (not a beta-version), or exclusively On-demand products. (4) 
Revenue was generated by both, On-premises and On-demand products, or the company had even 
finished its transformation process and was generating revenue only from On-demand software 
products. With regard to other characteristics such as size, branch, and age we decided on a broader 
focus without restrictions. Companies were accessed by means of network events, conferences, and 
cooperation in former projects. Thirdly, our case studies had an inductive purpose. Lastly, this case 
study was retrospective, since we collected past data at a single point in time.  
3.2 Research Setting  
The sample size in qualitative studies depends on the judgment of the researcher (Pare, 2004; Yin, 
2009) and we decided on two case studies. This was based on our requirement of gathering sufficient 
information to answer the research questions. Our companies‟ headquarters are both located in 
Germany. Company A was founded in the early 1970s while Company B was founded in the late 
1980s. Both companies offer Business-to-Business (B2B) application software and started as pure On-
premises providers. In 2012, Company A‟s sales exceeded €16 Billion and had more than 65.000 
employees. By contrast, Company B‟s sales exceeded €20 Million with just 120 employees 
worldwide. Our companies are therefore classified as large (A) and small to medium-sized (B). Both 
companies are internationally represented and their products are available in several countries and 
languages. Both companies started some years ago with an On-demand strategy. Nowadays, they both 
offer SaaS products besides their On-premises software. Their cloud-based products generate 10% (A) 
and up to 1% (B) share in turnover. These percentage shares should not be underestimated. Both 
companies traditionally operate in the B2B On-premises market where license contracts continue to 
exist over a certain amount of time and cannot be displaced by other arrangements immediately. 
3.3 Data collection and analysis  
In order to ensure a triangulation of findings (Yin, 2009), we collected qualitative and quantitative 
data from multiple sources e.g. a wide range of industry magazines, newspaper articles, companies' 
annual reports, studies and official statistics. In our research setting, in-depth interviews were a key 
means of probing individuals‟ subjective experiences (Suddaby, 2006). 
Several semi-structured face-to-face interviews with managers and specialists formed the basis of the 
data collection process, with managers answering the extended version of our questionnaire. The 
extended version included questions about the interviewees themselves, their current position in the 
company, and role within the transformation process. Following these personal details, the interview 
listed several questions concerning cloud computing technology and to what extent the interviewee 
judged its disruptive potential on the software market. In this way we were also able to ensure that the 
participant‟s role and organizational context was taken into account (Dibbern et al., 2008). In the third 
part the manager described in detail the company‟s transformation process. The fourth part of the 
interview discussed aspects concerning the theory of disruptive innovation. We conducted the 
extended version of the interview with the Head of Cloud Strategic Operations and Key Projects and 
Senior Vice President (Company A) and the company‟s president (Company B). These interviews 
were conducted in fall 2013 and each interview lasted 120 minutes. The managers recommended 
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employees who were familiar with the transformation process and therefore suitable for further 
interviews. Within the transformation process these employees were responsible for topics that related 
to infrastructure and product (Company A) as well as online operations and products (Company B). 
These employees received a shorter version of the questionnaire, which included personal information, 
questions about cloud computing technology as well as a detailed section targeting the theory of 
disruptive innovation. This method meant we were able to cross-check the managers‟ statements. 
Interviews with employees were conducted immediately after those with the manager and were 60 
minutes in length. The recorded case studies were professionally transcribed, stored and saved.  
We concentrated on the companies‟ individual transformation process and tried to discover what we 
could learn from them and their transformation strategy. In the second step, we analyzed to what 
extent Christensen‟s recommendations were applicable to software companies in general. In order to 
answer these two research questions we made transcripts of the recorded interviews. We then created 
summaries of each of the interviews and added relevant information from additional sources. From 
these case summaries, we derived strategic decisions in the individual transformation process. 
Afterwards, we identified statements which matched the four categories given by Christensen‟s theory. 
Due to the fact that not all aspects matched these four categories, we allowed some statements to open 
up new categories. Thus, we were able to produce further recommendations based on our 
observations. Following replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989) we revisited our data to examine the 
companies‟ strategies and always cross-checked our findings with secondary data. Working with a 
research partner also provides assistance (Benbasat et al., 1987). Thus, a second researcher coded the 
data separately. In the end, the two researchers fully agreed with the outcomes. 
4 Results  
4.1 Within-case results (Individual Business Strategy) 
In this chapter we focus on the two research questions. In order to answer these questions we first 
present our case study partners separately (paragraph 4.1). We then try to adapt these strategies to the 
four categories (4.2). Afterwards we work out important individual strategies as well as interesting 
commonalities in strategies, despite differences in companies‟ characteristics (4.3). In the last 
paragraph of this chapter (4.4) we present seven propositions, summarizing what we learned from 
successful software incumbents and their transformation strategies (1
st
 research question) and to what 
extent the theory‟s recommendations are applicable to software companies (2nd research question).  
4.1.1 Case 1: Company A 
Following some basic discussions about the dynamics in the software industry, Company A formed a 
group for solution and product management in 2005 which finally resulted in the establishment of a 
separate On-demand business unit operating independently from the On-premises business. The On-
demand division was equipped with decision-making powers and resource competences. Thus, the 
company tried to prevent conflicts of goals concerning established and new businesses. For the 
separate unit, the company recruited internal and external staff. Internally, they tried to acquire the 
most innovative employees. Externally, they looked for experienced people. Some of the external 
employees had previously gained experience in transformation processes in other companies and 
industries. “It is important to have a powerful team with innovative-experienced employees. They are 
engaged concerning the transformation idea” said the Senior Vice President. Based on market research 
institutes and industry experts, the company expected a large On-demand market to emerge. Instead of 
focusing on the whole transformation right from the start, the company started from 2005 to 2007 with 
the idea of building up a new business area. “It is only possible to transform the company when there 
is a strong established business unit alongside the new business area protecting the growing business” 
said the Senior Vice President. In order to keep the established business strong, the company ensured 
not to cannibalize established products. The idea was to address a completely new customer group 
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with On-demand products. Thus, Company A provided big customers with the established On-
premises product and targeted small and medium-sized companies with the On-demand solution. “The 
company needs to make the market wherever possible, rather than react to what is going on within it” 
stated the Senior Vice President, adding “It's not the big one who eats the little one, but the fast one 
that eats the slow one.”  
First, the company tried to supply new customer groups by simply transferring an unchanged On-
premises product into the cloud. However, this strategy was unsuccessful. Company A had to identify 
the most important cost drivers of their On-premises product first and learn how to build software that 
could be offered on a cloud infrastructure. “We had to learn that we had to transform internal 
competence first, before we could offer an On-demand product” an employee said. This learning was 
expensive and lengthy. “During this trial and error phase the company lost a lot of money” added the 
Senior Vice President. Another lesson learned in this phase was that On-demand software met much 
higher expectations concerning attributes such as accuracy, freedom from errors, and robustness 
compared to On-premises software. Although the company knew that it was important to step into the 
market as a leader, they were also aware that this should not happen at any cost. Quality was important 
in order to maintain the company‟s brand name. Within the On-premises world the company‟s brand 
name was associated with high quality standards. Offering an On-demand solution containing bugs 
would carry the risk of losing this status in the new market and in established business. Nevertheless, 
the company discovered that a brand name was extremely helpful in entering a new market as 
customers already trusted the company.  
Based on cash flow, the company was able to build up the On-demand business unit. The company‟s 
basic message was: Cash is used to grow the business. Company A was in the fortunate situation of 
needing neither venture capital nor loan capital. Thus, they were not required to justify decisions to 
third party investors. This strategy caused shareholders to call for a higher dividend payout instead of 
investments in On-demand products. “It was only possible to financially support the separate business 
unit because the management held firm to its decision” said the Senior Vice President. Additionally, 
Company A decided against employing consulting firms which enabled it to remain independent.   
The company was embedded in an ecosystem including hardware, technology and implementation 
partners. A strong ecosystem helped all partners to grow and lessened the chance of potential future 
rivalries. In order not to lose important partners such as subcontractors and suppliers during the 
transformation process, the company encouraged these firms to step into the new market in 
partnership. A lot of their suppliers adjusted their products and joined the company. Thus, Company A 
was able to work with familiar partners whom they trusted. The company managed to grow in a new 
business without losing the advantages of its established ecosystem. The key phrase in the ecosystem 
approach is co-innovation strategy. Existing and potentially new customers were invited. Together 
with employees and members from the management, they designed On-demand product features. “The 
co-innovation approach was the most important way of developing new products and services” 
stressed the interview partners independently. Immediately after these meetings, ideas and innovations 
were developed, implemented, and finally tested within a fictitious firm as well as in companies that 
are sister companies. A sister company is managed by executive directors from Company A. Thus, 
software prototypes were first rolled out to associated partners. When all bugs had been fixed, the 
product was introduced to the mass market. Simultaneously, Company A compared the prices of 
comparable products from competitors in order to set prices competitively.  
In the later transformation stage, the strategic acquisition of start-up companies was an important step. 
The company discovered that entering the market with a homegrown product offering a complete 
solution in the cloud was not the best strategy to penetrate the On-demand market. “The company 
learned that the cloud market was not ready for such a comprehensive solution” the employee stated. 
Thus, the company invested in the acquisition of more focused cloud solutions. Consequently, the 
company accessed new ideas and knowledge and strengthened its position in the market. Acquired 
companies were treated individually, some staying independent, while others were incorporated. 
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Today, the company considers itself as an On-demand company and sees itself nearly at the end of the 
transformation process. With a turnover rate of 10% concerning On-demand products the Senior Vice 
President believes that “in the next years this business area will further expand.” Concerning the next 
megatrend, he added: “I think the next step will be industry 4.0 focusing on medical technology and 
big data applications. Thus, the next revolution will focus on the content of software and not on the 
way we consume it”. 
4.1.2 Case 2: Company B 
“Our way into the cloud started six years ago,” recalled one manager at Company B. The company 
followed a step by step approach with carefully thought out procedures, some of which came as a 
logical progression from prior company decisions. The company decided to develop an On-premises 
software that was multi-client capable and scaleable. Therefore, basic features for the On-demand 
product already existed before the company decided to step into the new market. This software 
architecture positively influenced the development of the On-demand software. Nevertheless, the 
company experienced difficulties until it finally released its first SaaS version. “It took a lot of effort, 
time and money to convert our software to a browser client infrastructure” the manager said. 
Transforming internal competences and generating know-how is important to realize the 
transformation process. Skills in terms of product development and product placement were generated 
through a learning by doing approach, expert interviews at fairs, and analyzing rival firms‟ strategies 
and price policies. In addition, the company acquired another firm in order to benefit from its know-
how and technology. Another interesting way of generating new ideas and knowledge was the 
foundation of a virtual start-up company. The manager explained, “We gave three students some SaaS 
prototype and the challenge of improving it until it was ready for the market”. These students were 
intrinsically highly motivated and came up with completely new solutions for existing problems. 
Furthermore, they were not as expensive as regular employees “By means of this strategy we saved 
internal resources by generating added value at the same time” said the manager. 
The company was not large enough to establish a separate spin-off that was exclusively responsible 
for an On-demand product. However, it was possible to found an online group. Employees in this 
group focused exclusively on the development of a SaaS product. “We found that online group 
members were motivated and engaged” the manager stated. Probably the reason for this was that the 
company selected people showing a high acceptance for the development of new businesses. “Staff 
from established business units were not jealous or skeptical because I clearly communicated that the 
On-demand business wouldn‟t cannibalize established products” stressed the manager. The 
communication and the manager‟s attitude was key in the transformation process, the manager stating 
“such a comprehensive process is only successful with strong managerial support in the background”. 
In addition, the core business had to continue to work independently alongside the development of 
new business areas. “Generally, this is a matter for bosses” he said. 
The company faced two crucial issues in the transformation process: the general demand for SaaS 
product in the market and the distribution constellation with resellers. The company believed strongly 
in the idea that cloud computing would soon disrupt the structures of the software market. With 
hindsight, the manager admitted that they had “slightly overestimated the demand at that time”. This 
overestimation was caused by an overreliance on market forecasts and the fact that the company‟s 
customers asked specifically for On-demand products. Despite the customers‟ interest in SaaS 
solution, in the end they opted for the established On-premises product. Asking customers about this 
behavior, they stated that they had more trust in an On-premises solution but intended to switch in a 
few years‟ time. “Consumers wanted to ensure that the supplier they chose could later provide them 
with an On-demand solution” the manager explained. “Customers and providers have to think about 
switching costs in this context. Thus, it is important to offer both types of software now” he added. 
Furthermore, because of the lead-time, the company was a step ahead compared to rival firms. When 
the market was finally ready for On-demand software, “we could offer a solution immediately while 
competitors were still in the middle of their trial and error phase” the manager said. The second critical 
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issue in the transformation process was the distribution structure. Originally, the company had 
cooperated with resellers which worked well as a strategy for the On-premises business. Now, the 
company was offering its resellers also On-demand software. These intermediaries presented both 
solutions to end users. However, resellers earned more money with the On-premises product. “In order 
to prevent resulting problems, we adjusted our incentive structure and paid the reseller 30% of the 
margin upfront to foster the On-demand product sells” the manager said. Additionally, the company 
started direct sales for the On-demand software in order to be independent from resellers.  
Company B supplies predominantly medium-sized companies with established products. According to 
the manager “part of our On-demand strategy is targeting smaller companies”. The reason for this 
decision is that smaller companies appreciate On-demand solutions, while medium-sized companies 
are more sceptical. “Our SaaS solution can learn from and grow with smaller customers”. Thus, the 
company sees this as a test market for bigger companies and bigger On-demand solutions. In addition, 
Company B used its own company as a test market. “We roll out the developed software in our 
company and employees test the prototype” an employee said. Due to fast internal feedback loops, the 
company was able to improve the software rapidly. The company‟s market forecast strategy 
concentrates currently on the observation of the big players‟ strategies. These market giants have the 
power to influence a customer‟s preferences and acceptance of innovative developments. In order to 
stay in touch with the latest trends and movements in the mass market, Company B found that it was 
essential for smaller companies to orientate on big players. However, “we are aware that this strategy 
is only useful to refine existing products and not to promote the development of completely new 
innovations” the manager stated. At this point it is important to underline that disruption is an ongoing 
force that is always at work (Christensen, 2006). Building on the sustaining innovation concerning the 
On-demand product could cause an imminent innovation to be missed. 
4.2 Applicability of Christensen’s recommendations 
Both companies established a separate business unit that worked independently. Due to the fact that 
Company B was a middle-sized firm, the foundation of a disconnected spin-off was not possible from 
an organizational and financial point of view. Thus, they founded an online group that was comparable 
to Christensen‟s idea. Projects and further steps concerning the development of the On-demand 
product could be discussed independently, focusing exclusively on the SaaS business area. The Senior 
Vice President (A) and the manager (B) both confirmed that the separation of responsibility and 
resource allocation was the only way to start a transformation process. Through our case studies we 
can see that Christensen‟s idea, the foundation of an independent organizational unit, is applicable to 
established companies in the software industry. However, the establishment of a completely 
disconnected spin-off is often not feasible for small and middle-sized companies.  
For both companies, it is likely that they survive in the changing market. They follow a leader 
strategy. “It's not the big one who eats the little one, but the fast one that eats the slow one”. That is 
why Company A stepped into the new market in an early phase although it was one of the biggest 
players in its field. Company B laid the foundation for their leader strategy with the development of 
their On-premises product. Strategic decisions concerning the established product led to the fact that 
Company B was able to transfer the software more easily and faster compared to rival firms. 
Additionally, it should be noted in this context that Company B offered both types of software (On-
premises and On-demand) in their early phase. This had signaling effects for their customers. When 
the market was finally ready to absorb On-demand software, the company could offer a solution and 
customers were able to switch easily from On-premises to On-demand without changing the provider. 
We observed that our case study partners stepped into their market segment as a leader. At the time of 
writing, it looks as if they will profit from this strategy. Thus, we see that the second recommendation 
is also applicable to well-established companies in the software industry. 
Our third category, the expert opinion strategy, cannot be supported that easily. Both companies took a 
long-term view and experienced disagreements concerning investment decisions. Company A had to 
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deal with lack of consensus over dividend payments as it was a listed company. Expert opinions were 
collected from multiple sources but not explicitly from the technology department. Company A relied 
on its superior ecosystem, cooperative partners, and customers. Company B also took big players into 
account and admitted that it would have been advisable in the past to work in closer collaboration with 
partners and customers. Thus, we can only partly confirm Christensen‟s third recommendation 
concerning our case study partners. Well-established companies in the software industry should extend 
the third strategy to a wider range of expert opinions in order to profit better from it. 
The fourth category - known as a trial and error strategy - focuses foremost on the usage of test 
markets or test products. It is notable that both companies had the same experiences concerning the 
On-demand product development. In the first place, both companies simply tried to transfer a nearly 
unchanged On-premises product into the cloud. Learning that this strategy was not feasible, they knew 
that they had to transform internal competence first, before offering an On-demand product. For both 
companies, this learning process was expensive and took a lot of time. When they did develop a first 
version of an On-demand product, both companies used test markets. Company A launched its 
innovation through a fictitious firm and sister companies while Company B used their own company 
as a test market. Interview partners from both companies confirmed that only through these 
experiences and from the resultant use of test markets, progress was achieved for the On-demand 
product development. Thus, we can confirm the importance and applicability of this strategy 
concerning our two representatives.  
Finally we can conclude that the recommendations derived from the theory of disruptive innovation 
are generally applicable to companies in the software industry. Because of different characteristics 
such as company size and branch, the application of these strategies will be unique.  
4.3 Individual strategies and commonalities despite differences 
Beside the four strategies presented above, we see that both companies developed individual strategies 
in order to cope with the transformation process. It is important to pick up the most interesting 
strategies and learn from them.  
Company A emphasized the importance of recruiting internal and external staff with the combination 
of the following attributes: innovation and experience. To achieve this, Company A used headhunters 
to entice employees from other companies. Company A ensured that it was attractive for potential 
employees through financial incentives and independent working structures. In addition, Company A 
was a well-known company with a secure job situation and a positive brand name. Due to its positive 
image within the software market, Company A was not only able to recruit new staff but also able to 
promote newly developed On-demand software through the use of its reputation. Furthermore, the 
establishment of new products in the On-demand market was pushed by the brand name. Consumers 
relied on this brand and trusted the quality promise. Therefore, Company A‟s strategy was to highlight 
the company‟s brand in order to acquire employees and promote On-demand software. 
Company B is much smaller and therefore its staff policies are hardly comparable to Company A. In 
order to generate new ideas without acquiring employees, Company B used strategies such as the 
establishment of a students‟ virtual start-up company. By means of this strategy they were able to 
generate new ideas and also cooperate with potentially new employees for the future. Furthermore, the 
distribution strategy was notable. As this company was heavily dependent on resellers, changing the 
distribution organization was part of the transformation process. The core of the new strategy 
consisted of two parts: the adjustment of incentive structures and the development of direct sales for 
On-demand software. This was the only way to promote On-demand solutions. 
Analyzing the companies and the markets they operate in, we see two main differences. Company A is 
much larger (65.000 employees) than Company B (120 employees). Thus, they have different 
organizational structures, financial backgrounds, and brand name awareness. Additionally they operate 
in different markets. Besides size and market segment, Company A enjoyed greater market dominance 
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than Company B. This might also be an explaining factor concerning their experience. Nevertheless, it 
is remarkable that many similarities in strategy concerning the transformation process can be observed 
in both companies. These commonalities are presented here.  
Both companies started by focusing on the establishment of a new business area instead of targeting 
the company‟s whole transformation. The process from an On-premises to an On-demand company 
was a step by step approach that took time and money for both incumbents. While the companies were 
transformed, the core business continued to work independently alongside the new business areas. 
However, in the long run, the companies wanted to transform completely in order to survive in the 
market. Chen and Zhan (2013) are able to confirm the applicability of this finding with an empirically 
study on the impacts of SaaS on the financial performance of established On-premises software.  
This vision was supported by strong management, with both companies being led by determined and 
ambitious managers. A historical comparison to the change from mainframes and microcomputers to 
client-server computing supports this finding, too. There was a difference between a firm that was well 
managed and prepared for sustaining innovation compared to a firm that was able to manage this 
fundamental change. Only software companies of the second category were able to successfully 
survive. Although managers of the first category were aware of the innovation, only managers of the 
second category were able to react adequately. Managers of the first category had the impression that 
their business environment did not allow them to pursue the change. They decided against the 
investment in the new technology because it was not profitable enough in the beginning and would 
have incorporated taking away scarce resources from sustaining developments, which in turn were 
needed to compete against current competition. Thus, a software companies‟ ability to manage 
fundamental changes was essential to economic survival. 
While smaller customers seem to be more comfortable with accepting On-demand software in the B2B 
market, big companies are still relatively reserved concerning such solutions (Berendes et al., 2013). 
Doubtless, a reason for this is the contract period of existing licenses. Although our case study partners 
operate in different market fields, it is clear that both followed the same strategy concerning new 
costumer groups. Both address firms in the B2B market which are smaller compared to established 
customer firms. Company A had previously provided big companies with their On-premises software 
and has now developed On-demand software for middle-sized companies. Company B previously 
served middle-sized companies in the On-premises world while focusing on small companies in the 
On-demand market. It seems that companies have to take one step back when developing a product 
based on new technology. Due to this strategy both companies did not cannibalize established markets 
and were able to grow with the new customer group. A further similarity can be found in the fact that 
the transformation process was financed out of the company‟s cash-flow. This is an advisable strategy 
because no third party has the right to intervene in decisions and processes. Another very important 
strategy that both companies followed was the acquisition of other companies. Part of the acquisition 
strategy is to look for companies that have a good cultural fit and additionally accelerate the 
implementation of the own strategy. Each acquisition needs a tailor-made integration scenario. Thus, 
the innovation capability of the target company is preserved. Company A and B profited from the 
innovation capability, the know-how and technology of these companies.  
4.4 Propositions 
To conclude, we will summarize what we learned from software incumbents and their transformation 
strategy and to what extent Christensen‟s recommendations are applicable for software companies. 
Based on the findings of our study, we suggest that a successful transformation strategy in terms of an 
On-premises to an On-demand supplier consists of the combination of Christensen‟s recommendations 
and its individual adjustments as well as some additional strategies. From a management perspective 
we would suggest the following propositions (Tab.1). (1) to (4) are foremost based on the theory of 
disruptive innovation (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 
1997). Additionally we list propositions (5) to (7) according to important individual and common 
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strategies of our case study partners. The application of recommendations for well-established 
incumbents in the software industry seems feasible. The recommendations of the theory of disruptive 
innovation focus on large companies. Due to our choosing case study partners who ranged widely in 
terms of size, we are able to relativize these recommendations and can provide small and medium-
sized companies with some strategic advice. 
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1 The foundation of an independent spin-off or a comparable organizational unit could help 
preventing resource allocation conflicts and the company might therefore more easily follow 
potentially disruptive innovations. 
2 Preparing the company at an early stage for the innovation and stepping into the market as a 
leader could be a wise strategy. The company might gather useful experience and might use 
their time constructively in developing prototypes before offering a stable mass market 
version. 
3 Gathering information from a wide range of sources (technological staff, cooperation 
partners, customers, market movements) and sticking to the adopted path despite resistance 
(e.g. from shareholders) seems to be a promising strategy in order to support the 
transformation process. 
4 Integrating test products and test markets into the development and prototype phase might 
prove helpful and an important step towards a piece of fully developed software. This might 
be especially recommended for rolling out high quality products (robustness, stability, etc.) in 
the B2B market. 
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s 5 Recruiting innovative and experienced staff could help in realizing the transformation process 
successfully. Thereby ideas and innovation may also spring from cooperation e.g. with 
university or customers. The company might also benefit from strong managerial support. 
6 It might be a good idea to distribute On-demand software directly. Companies could also 
financially incentivize resellers to foster On-demand sales. 
7 The transformation might be better organized in a step by step approach focusing on smaller 
software solutions in the beginning. In the course of time, the smaller On-demand solution 
could grow with its first customers and gain the attention of larger clients. 
Table 1. Seven Propositions 
5 Discussion, Limitations, Future Research  
Over recent decades firms have used IT for strategic and competitive goals, for generating business 
value and for gaining competitive advantage. IT has enabled new business models and service 
innovations and opened up new ways to offer products to the market (Buxmann et al., 2008). Thus, 
our field needs to look at where IT makes an impact on firms and on the software economy. With our 
study, we tried to make a contribution to this important area. 
Our objective is to investigate the strategy of well-established software companies and how they 
behave successfully in a changing software market. In particular, we focus on the strategic 
transformation process. We have seen that a company needs an effective IT strategy in order to 
survive market changes. The use of new strategies and shunning well-established processes challenges 
traditional companies in the market. This ranges from the decision making process, IT development 
tasks to the establishment of new areas of operations. We saw that in all cases mechanisms, roles, and 
structures are needed in order to focus on a company‟s strategic goal and therefore support findings 
from Bower and Gilbert (2005). We learned from their strategies and brought them in line with 
Christensen‟s theory of disruptive innovation. Finally, we learned that a successful transformation 
strategy consists of the combination of Christensen et al.‟s recommendations, individual adjustments, 
as well as some additional strategies. The considerations of characteristics such as size or branch are 
important to develop individual approaches. However, despite these differences there are 
recommendations which could be helpful for both companies. In the end, we were able to develop 
seven propositions for software companies to better cope with the transformation process. Thus, we 
have provided a deeper and richer insight into the area of a software company‟s IT strategy, especially 
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in the SaaS business and we hope to have added constructively to the literature of disruptive 
innovation. Additionally, we learned that the market for cloud solutions is growing but currently 
market demand falls short of expectations. Consumers of IT services are faced with complex decisions 
for which they have to take both quantitative and qualitative factors into account. Berendes et al. 
(2013) found out that cloud solutions are so far only useful for fast-growing start-up companies. 
Larger companies with special requirements cannot, as yet, realize cost reduction. This might be a 
reason for the currently restrained market demand.  
As with any research, there are a number of limitations that the present paper must acknowledge. As 
this paper is a predominately qualitative study, generalization of the results is only possible to a 
limited extent (Myers, 2009). Thus, the results of this study should be viewed as preliminary and 
interpreted in the appropriate context. We cannot answer the question whether the results would be the 
same for other branches in the software industry. This limitation is partially addressed by the multiple 
case study approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), which included two organizations operating in 
different markets. We would like to expand the study to other software incumbents in the software 
industry. Additionally, we want to see if there are specific patterns visible concerning company sizes 
and the branches in which they operate. This study relies partly on retrospective data. Thus, 
respondents can perhaps only imperfectly recall decisions or events. In order to minimize the possible 
effect of this, the collected data was triangulated. Due to the fact that we asked several people within 
each company, decisions and events were reported from different perspectives and thus we could 
reconstruct the facts more accurately. Additionally, we used multiple sources to cross-check 
statements. More additional research must be done (Bower and Gilbert, 2005) and future research is 
needed to validate the present study‟s findings and add more companies to the sample. 
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